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SUSTAINING PROGRESSIVITY IN THE
BUDGET PROCESS: A COMMENTARY ON
GALE & ORSZAG'S AN ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENT OF TAX POLICY IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION, 2001-2004
LINDA SUGIN*
Abstract: This Commentary proposes the adoption of pay-go procedural
rules for tax lawmaking that favor tax cuts that decrease income inequality,
in response to biases in distributional tables and distortions in the political
process. It suggests that the failure to use present value analysis in the
budget process has had unfortunate, unintended consequences, in par-
ticular, a congressional preference for a prepaid-type consumption tax.
This Commentary argues that efforts to index the Alternative Minimum
Tax (the "AMT") should not deflect attention from the AMT's most
fundamental distributional problem-its failure to treat dividends and
capital gains as preference items. It suggests that there may be some
institutional advantages in global sunsets of important tax legislation, even
when the legislation is not intended to expire. Finally, this Commentary
considers the intersection of budget processes and progressivity in the tax
expenditure budget. It argues that the Bush administration's recent
changes in the treatment of the corporate tax and its incomplete analysis
of comprehensive tax bases, undermine the usefulness of the tax expen-
diture budget, and have made tax expenditures suddenly appear more
progressive, even though they are not.
INTRODUCTION
Doctors William Gale and Peter Orszag, in An Economic Assessment
of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration, 2001-2004, present a disturbing
picture of recent tax policy: one that is fiscally irresponsible and de-
creasingly progressive.1 Their analysis demands that economists and
lawyers work together to design a policy that will strive simultaneously
* © 2004, Linda Sugin, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
I would like to thank Noel Cunningham and Paul McDaniel for comments on an earlier
draft.
I See generally William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in
the Bush Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1157 (2004).
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for economic justice and fiscal discipline. In response to their eco-
nomic analysis, this Commentary identifies some of the legal challenges
that their analysis presents. In particular, I suggest the adoption of pro-
cedural mechanisms and substantive biases into tax law making that are
explicitly designed to address inequality, even while lawmakers primar-
ily focus on fiscal responsibility and economic growth.
This Commentary addresses four issues raised by Doctors Gale and
Orszag that lend themselves to legislative or administrative approaches
that could be sensitive to distributional effects, and my suggestions are
offered in the spirit of specifically meeting some of the concerns identi-
fied in their Article. First, a major theme of Doctors Gale and Orszag's
analysis is the affordability of the George W. Bush administration's tax
cuts, and their analysis indicates how difficult it will be to pay for a
permanent extension of those policies. 2 The current impasse in Con-
gress on deficits and revenue centers on budget rules, specifically
whether lawmakers should adopt a pay-go rule that requires tax cuts to
be offset concurrently with spending cuts (or tax increases). 3 Although
I agree with the many commentators who argue that Congress should
reenact a so-called pay-go rule for tax lawmaking,4 I propose that such a
rule should serve the dual goals of distributive fairness and fiscal disci-
2 See id. at 1168-83.
3 As of this writing, the Senate has adopted a pay-go rule that would apply to all tax cuts
and spending increases, but the House of Representatives has declined to follow suit. See S.
Con. Res. 95, 108th Cong. § 408 (2004) (enacted). The George W. Bush administration has
argued for a rule that requires fiscal discipline only for spending. See OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, ENSURING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 35, 36, 38 (2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2005/pdf/budget/fiscal.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STATEMENT OF ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE POLICY, H.R. 3973-SPENDING CONTROL ACT OF 2004 (June 23, 2004) [herein-
after STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/legislative/sap/108-2/hr3973sap-h.pdf. For an explanation of why the Bush admini-
stration's rule is meaningless, see generally Paul McDaniel, Commentary: Assessing the Bush
Administration's Tax Agenda, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1247 (2004) (discussing tax expenditures).
4 Tax policy analysts have overwhelmingly supported such a rule. See Sheldon Pollack,
Contemporary U.S. Tax Policy, 104 TAX NOTES 309, 309 (2004) (reviewing C. EUGENE
STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY (2004)); Timothy Catts, Greenspan Calls for Tax
Cut Offsets as Senate Mulls Reconciliation Options, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 26, 2004),
LEXIS, 2004 TNT 38-1; Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, CBPP Calls for Renewal of Pay-Go
Rules, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 20, 2004), LEXIS, 2004 TNT 77-20; Comm. for a Re-
sponsible Fed. Budget, Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Supports Pay-Go Rules, 2004
TAx NOTES TODAY (Mar. 16, 2004), LEXIS, 2004 TNT 52-18; Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Budget
Process Reform Could Have "Unintended Consequences," CBO Director Testifies, 2004 TAX NoTEs
TODAY (Mar. 23, 2004), LEXIS, 2004 TNT 57-51; Richard E. May, Beware of Some Budget
Reform Ideas, Legislative Consultant Testifies, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 23, 2004), LEXIS,
2004 TNT 57-55.
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pline by creating a bias in favor of tax cuts that decrease income ine-
quality and a bias against tax cuts that increase income inequality. The
data in Doctors Gale and Orszag's Article support this more nuanced
approach to procedural budget rules. 5
A second theme of Doctors Gale and Orszag's Article is the mis-
leading budget picture created by the expanding number of expiring
provisions and backloaded tax cuts. They argue that sunsets have been
used to allow a larger annual tax cut to fit within a given multi-year
budget total.6 In response, I suggest that the sunset of the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the "2001 Act")
does not look as bad now as it did when it was first adopted, and that
there may be some advantages in global sunsets of important tax legis-
lation.7 Furthermore, sunsets may not be the most pressing problem in
the presentation of budget numbers. The failure to account for present
values may cause greater distortion in the budget process, and some of
the manipulation apparent in budget numbers would be impossible if
present values were required. Even more important, I argue that the
failure of budget procedures to use present value analysis has contrib-
uted to an unnecessarily regressive design of recent rules.
8
A third major concern that Doctors Gale and Orszag (and many
others) discuss is the Alternative Minimum Tax (the "AMT").9 They
predict that it will affect forty million taxpayers by 2014,10 and they
imply that indexing the exemption for inflation could, in part, fix the
problems of the AMT.1 Although indexing is clearly desirable com-
pared to Congress's current inclination to do nothing,12 I argue that a
focus on indexing the AMT may distract policymakers from the more
fundamental design problems inherent in the AMT, and that the 2003
5 See infra notes 17-34 and accompanying text.
6 Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1184.
7 Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
8 See infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
9 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1165-66. National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson,
in her 2003 report to Congress, stated that the Alternative Minimum Tax (the "AMT") is the
most serious problem facing taxpayers. See Nina E. Olson, Preface to INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS, at iv (Dec. 31, 2003) (stating that the AMT is the problem that needs "the most ini-
mediate and thorough response"), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta_2003_an
nual update mcw_1-15-041.pdf.
10 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1165; see also Appendix 1 (prepared by William G.
Gale).
11 Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1165-66.
12 As this issue goes to press, President Bush is signing the Working Families Tax Relief
Act of 2004, which extends the current exemptions for AMT purposes through 2005. H.R.
1308, 108th Cong. § 103 (2004) (presented to President Bush on September 9, 2004).
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dividend and capital gains tax cuts13 now pose the greatest challenge
for redesigning the AMT 1 4
Finally, because this Symposium is about both progressivity and
budget processes and because Doctors Gale and Orszag's Article ar-
gues that the Bush administration has given a "misleading" budget
picture, 15 I think it is important to note that the Bush administration
has been undermining the information presented in the tax expendi-
ture budget (the 'TEB") by gradually modifying the baseline it uses in
its analyses and skewing that baseline so that tax expenditures look
more progressive than they really are.16
I. PAYING FOR TAX CUTS WHILE PRESERVING PROGRESSIVITY
Ideally, taxes and spending would be determined as one inte-
grated policy.' 7 Unfortunately, we rarely see an analysis that considers
both the taxing and spending sides of the budget equation together.
The numbers in Doctors Gale and Orszag's Table 6 are the type of
information typically seen in analyses of tax changes, and they con-
firm the Bush administration's claim that everyone gets a tax cut.18
But they are incomplete because either our children will pay for these
cuts later,19 or some of us will be paying for them soon through the
loss of government services. 20 As the recent tax cuts inevitably will
squeeze some government services, it becomes important to consider
who will pay the price for those cuts. Tables 7 and 8 are the missing
piece in most analyses. 21 They contain a distributional analysis of the
incidence of the Bush administration's tax cuts and the spending cuts
13 See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
§§ 301-302, 117 Stat. 752, 758-64 (2003) (codified at I.R.C. § 1(h) (West Supp. 2004)) (re-
ducing rate on net capital gain to five percent and fifteen percent and treating dividends
like net capital gain).
14 See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
15 Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1173.
16 See infra notes 69-110 and accompanying text.
17 In this way, we really could determine whether the overall system of economic rights
and responsibilities is truly just. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWN-
ERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 14 (2002) (arguing that traditional tax policy analysis has been
myooic" in treating "justice in taxation as a separate and self-contained ... issue").
1 Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at app. tbl.6.
19 Deficit financing for tax cuts may push the burden of payment onto future genera-
tions. See Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1176; see also William Gale & Laurence Kotlikoff,
Effects of Recent FiscalPolicies on Children, 103 TAX NOTES 1281, 1281 (2004).
20 Doctors Gale and Orszag's Table 4 offers hypothetical (and unrealistically large)
spending cuts that would be necessary to pay for the tax cuts. See Gale & Orszag, supra note
1, at app. tbl.4.
21 See id. at app. tbls.7 & 8.
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that will be needed to pay for them, and they attempt to provide com-
prehensive information on the incidence of the tax cuts by looking at
how they will be financed. This is the type of information that we
need to understand the full picture of tax cuts, and I hope that it will
become a regular part of government budget analyses in the future.
Tables 7 and 8 show that the real burden of the Bush administration's
tax cuts will fall on households in the bottom four quintiles.
22
I suggest that the assumption that Doctors Gale and Orszag make
in generating the numbers in these tables may understate the real
burden that will be borne by low-income taxpayers. Their more pro-
gressive assumption is that the tax cuts will be financed by tax in-
creases or spending cuts that impose burdens that are proportional to
income. 23 But given the limited discretion that Congress has to adjust
spending, it is actually much more likely that the tax cuts will be paid
for with spending cuts (or tax increases) borne disproportionately by
low-income families. Domestic discretionary spending on programs
like education, infrastructure, and social services will be the easiest
targets for spending cuts. 24 The assumption that Doctors Gale and
Orszag make is reasonable in light of our ignorance about which poli-
cies actually will be adopted, but it paints a brighter picture for low-
income Americans than is realistic. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of
tax and spending cuts would likely show a significantly more regres-
sive pattern than reflected in Tables 7 and 8.
Unfortunately, the government does not do a comprehensive
analysis, so legislation is adopted on the basis of information that
looks more like Table 6 than Table 8.25 This information skews the
perception that lawmakers have of the effects of their actions, making
it important to balance that bias with a counteracting mechanism.
Procedural rules could be designed to reflect the fact that distribu-
tional tables systematically understate the burden that tax cuts impose
22 See id. at app. tbls.7 & 8. For a fuller analysis of this issue by Doctors Gale and Orszag
and Isaac Shapiro, see generally William Gale et al., Distribution of the 2001 and 2003 Tax
Cuts and TheirFinancing, 103 TAX NOTES 1539 (2004).
23 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1190.
24 The Bush administration's 2005 budget includes these cuts. See generally CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, ADMINISTRATION'S BUDGET WOULD CUT HEAVILY INTO
MANY AREAS OF DOMESTIC DISCRETIONARY SPENDING AFTER 2005 (Mar. 5, 2004) (detail-
ing cuts to environmental, educational, veterans, health, and transportation programs),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-27-04bud2.pdf; Press Release, Ctr. on Budget & Policy
Priorities, President's Budget Would Slash Major Housing Program by 30 Percent by 2009
(Mar. 8, 2004) (describing 2005 proposed budget cuts to the federal housing voucher pro-
gram), available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-12-04hous-pr.pdf.
25 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at app. tbls.6 & 8.
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on low-income households. I propose a pay-go rule corrected for the
bias inherent in the distributional tables by incorporating a bias in
favor of tax cuts for low-income units, but against tax cuts for high-
income units. Tax cuts that decrease inequality could be subject to
lower procedural hurdles than tax cuts that increase inequality.26 In-
cluding a bias against regressive tax cuts can be understood as a
mechanism for better integrating the taxing and spending sides of the
budget that are often considered in isolation from one another.
It also makes sense to have different procedural rules, depending
upon the distributional effects of the underlying substantive provi-
sions, because of the political economy of tax cuts. In addition to
compensating for the invisibility of spending cuts that burden the low-
income units, procedural rules could also help correct for distortions
in our political system that systematically disadvantage the poor.27
Procedural rules benefiting the poor are a good mechanism for coun-
terbalancing the disproportionate share of political power enjoyed by
the rich for their own benefit. To the extent that political preferences
are likely to be distributed throughout the income spectrum, we may
be comfortable with the rich speaking generally on behalf of the poor.
But for economic issues, the divergent interests of the rich and poor
should be troubling in our political system.
The current debate about budget rules has been focused on the
readoption of a pay-go rule, 28 with some people arguing that a pay-go
rule should cover only spending and other people arguing that it
should apply to both tax cuts and spending. 29 Unfortunately, the de-
26 Although the details are not crucial to the idea, such a rule could require a super-
majority vote in both Houses of Congress for tax cuts that provide larger increases in after-
tax income for high-income taxpayers than for low-income taxpayers. This rule adopts the
most widely accepted notion of progressivity, and the Tax Policy Center already provides
this type of data. See Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1187 (providing a standard treatment
of progressivity).
27 The rich are not only big campaign contributors who are ably represented by lobby-
ists; they are often the politicians themselves. For example, all four candidates on the 2004
presidential ticket were millionaires.
28 See, e.g., H.R. 4663, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 3973, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Con. Res.
95, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted) (setting forth congressional budget resolution). As part
of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Congress adopted a rule that required revenue
cuts to be matched by spending cuts. That legislation expired on September 30, 2002. See
Martin Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Will Budget Rules Chill Tax Cut Fever, 100 TAx NoTES
1241. 1243 (2003).
29 H.R. 4663, which failed to pass the House of Representatives, would have applied to
spending, but not tax cuts. President Bush supports that approach. See STATEMENT OF AD-
MINISTRATIVE POLICY, supra note 3. A substitute amendment to H.R. 4663 also would have
[Vol. 45:12591264
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bate about a pay-go rule is taking place against the backdrop of provi-
sions benefiting the poor and middle class that are scheduled to ex-
pire this year.30 The proponents of a broad pay-go rule are clearly
more serious about real fiscal restraint, but they might not be
sufficiently sensitive to the differing distributional issues that arise de-
pending on the particular tax or spending provision. The more nu-
anced pay-go rule that I propose would be less likely than a blanket
rule to hold hostage to fiscal discipline tax cuts or spending increases
that benefit the poor.
The recent debate over the child tax credit provides a good ex-
ample. Last year, the House of Representatives voted not only to per-
manently extend the $1000 per child tax credit, but also to increase
the income ceiling for eligibility from $110,000 to $250,000 for mar-
ried couples. 31 The increased ceiling portion of the legislation would
have cost $69 billion, approximately thirty percent of the provision's
overall cost.3 2 If this legislation were subject to the type of pay-go rule
that I propose, increasing the income ceiling for eligibility would be
subject to a high procedural hurdle (that is, greater consensus) if not
financed by offsetting revenue increases or spending cuts in the bill.
Conversely, a distributionally sensitive procedural rule would be less
demanding of the provision that accelerates the refundable portion of
the credit for very poor families.33 The alternative that was offered by
House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means member
Charles Rangel would have been subject to a less stringent procedural
rule overall because it would have provided greater tax benefits to
poor people than prior law and higher rates for top earners, decreas-
ing income inequality in all of its aspects. 34 Although increased re-
extended the pay-go rules to tax cuts. See Dustin Stamper, House Fails to Pass Pay-Go Bill, 103
TAX NoTEs 1577, 1577 (2004).
30 Congress considered multiple expiring provisions in 2004. See, e.g., Child Credit
Preservation and Expansion Act of 2004, H.R. 4359, 108th Cong. (2004) (covering the
extension of the $1000 child credit); H.R. 4181, 108th Cong. (2004) (dealing with the
extension of marriage penalty relief for filers claiming the standard deduction); H.R. 4275,
108th Cong. (2004) (covering extension of the ten percent bracket); H.R. 4227, 108th
Cong. (2004) (dealing with the extension of AMT relief for only one year). These provi-
sions were included in some form in the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-311, §§ 101, 103, 118 Stat. 1166, 1167-68 (2004).
31 H.R. 4359 (adopted by the House of Representatives on May 20, 2004).
32 See Dustin Stamper, House Approves Child Credit Bill in Last of Four Tax Cut Measures,
103 TAX NoTEs 939, 939 (2004) (citing statistics from the Tax Policy Center).
33 H.R. 4359, § 2(c) (accelerating the increase in the refundable portion of credit).
Representative Charles Rangel's alternative to H.R. 4359 would have increased the
refundability of the credit for low-income households, would have repealed an inflation
adjustment that applies to low income families, and also would have increased the rate of
12652004]
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fundability would require government resources, the proposed pro-
cedural rule that I suggest effectively abrogates the pay-go constraint
for inequality-reducing changes.
This more nuanced approach to budget rules clearly adds some
complexity to the legislative process, but not to the Internal Revenue
Code (the "Code") itself, in which increased complexity is most trou-
bling. Under such an approach, lawmakers would be required to sepa-
rate out the analysis of different parts of a single piece of legislation
and to focus on the distributional effect of every part, a welcome im-
provement to the clarity of the legislative process. Although over-
whelmingly favorable to the rich, the Bush administration's tax cuts
contain provisions that benefit the poor and the rich. The tendency to
discuss all of the Bush administration's tax cuts as a single monolith
threatens to sweep the treatment of the more progressive provisions in
with the regressive provisions. The effort to extend the ten percent
bracket or the child tax credit should neither be part of the same de-
bate nor be subject to the same procedural constraints that should ap-
ply to extending the rate reductions for the rich or permanently repeal-
ing the estate tax. Although procedural rules that create a bias in favor
of the poor cannot solve the fundamental problem of unequal political
power, they at least can shift the balance slightly so that benefits for the
rich require a higher level of consensus and transparency.
II. BUDGET NUMBERS AND SUNSETS
In their Article, Doctors Gale and Orszag discuss how the Bush
administration's time frame for analysis is misleading because the
costs of the Bush administration's proposals continue to grow
indefinitely into the future.35 They also describe how the tax cut's
budget effects differ in the long and the short terms.3 6 By carefully
circumscribing the parameters for the numbers presented, the Bush
administration can present the budget information so that it appears
more or less favorable. One problem of presentation in distribution
tables (and other budget documents) is the failure to include present
tax on income in excess of $1 million. See Charles B. Rangel, Rangel Substitute for H.R. 4359
Would Put Budgetary Conditions on Child Credit Extension, 2004 TAx NoTEs TODAY (May 17,
2004), LEXIS, 2004 TNT 97-25. The provision adopted by both Houses of Congress ex-
tended the $1000 credit amount and increased its refundability. See H.R. 1308, 108th
Cong. §§ 101 (a), 102 (2004).
3 Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1173.
6 Id. at 1172-75.
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value calculations for tax provisions with significant timing elements.
5 7
Budget numbers can be manipulated easily by choosing to adopt leg-
islation that maximizes revenues in the short run at the expense of
future revenues, and it is well known that the numbers that appear
within the budget window are not always what they seem. The secon-
dary effects of such manipulations, however, are less noticeable, and
they recently have included a bias toward less progressive provisions.
The incentive that Congress has to manipulate the schedule of reve-
nues by deferring costs into the future has encouraged the adoption
of particular substantive laws. For example, the increasing use of tax-
prepaid savings vehicles, in which all the potential revenue shortfall is
in the future, are favored by the budget rules that look to a short time
frame without present values. But they are troubling from a fairness
perspective because they contribute to the narrowing of the tax base
to wage income only.38
This trend is continuing to grow. The Bush administration is hop-
ing to expand the use of tax-prepaid savings vehicles with new Life-
time Savings Accounts ("LSA"). Like Roth Individual Retirement Ac-
counts ("IRA"), contributions to LSAs would be nondeductible, but
all withdrawals would be free of tax.3 9 We can expect LSAs to be a
more popular and widely used savings vehicle than the Roth IRA and
education savings plans currently in the Code, because the latter con-
tain significant restrictions on withdrawals, whereas the LSAs would
not. Taxpayers who can afford to save $5000 a year, the proposed
maximum in the Bush administration's 2005 budget proposal, will be
able to do so tax free for any purpose. 4° This would provide a
significant benefit when savings accrue over a long period. At the
same time that savers enjoy the generous tax break, the exemption of
capital income from tax under such a provision would barely show up
in the budget projections for the next ten years for the following two
reasons: (1) in the short term, taxpayers will be more likely to con-
tribute than to withdraw from such programs because they are new,
and contributions bear the full tax burden, and (2) any withdrawals
37 SenatorJoe Lieberman introduced a bill to require the government to calculate pre-
sent values for its liabilities, but it was not adopted. See Honest Government Accounting
Act, S. 1915, 108th Cong. (2003).
s8 These vehicles include Roth Individual Retirement Accounts, I.R.C. § 408A (West
Supp. 2004); tuition savings accounts, I.R.C. § 529; and health savings accounts, I.R.C. § 223.
9 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
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over the short term will not have had sufficient time to grow very
much, and the tax benefit increases as the earnings on the invest-
ments increase over time. In another paper, Doctors Gale and Orszag
have estimated that the long-term revenue losses from the Bush ad-
ministration's savings proposals are $1.30 in present value revenue
cost for every dollar collected today.41 Ignoring present values in de-
scribing the budget effects of new tax provisions encourages the
adoption of rules that appear cheap even though they are not, and
they have the unfortunate effect of moving the Code more in the di-
rection of a wage tax.
A wage tax not only tends to be more regressive than an income
tax, but also is more likely to be regressive than a cash-flow type con-
sumption tax, such as the traditional IRA, in which contributions are
deductible and withdrawals are taxed in full. A progressive cash-flow
type consumption tax is likely to be more progressive, in fact, than a
progressive wage tax because (1) a lower or middle income person
might have a lower marginal rate at retirement than during his or her
working years, whereas a rich person is more likely to have the same
(high) rate at both times, and (2) a cash-flow tax would impose more
tax on investors whose savings performed better over their lives and
who are therefore better off when savings are withdrawn for con-
sumption. Pre-paid and post-paid consumption taxes are often con-
sidered to be equivalent, but they are only equivalent ex ante, whereas
expost is what should matter for determining fairness. 42
Thus, the Code's move toward increasing prepaid-type savings ve-
hicles is troubling to the extent that it is a numbers-driven decision
about what kind of consumption tax to have, based on the perception
of short versus long-term budget effects. If we are going to move fur-
ther from an income tax and closer to a consumption tax, as we have
been doing over the past decade, 43 a cash-flow type consumption tax
41 See Leonard Burman, William Gale & Peter Orszag, Key Thoughts on RSAs and LSAs 2
(Feb. 2, 2004), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000600.pdf.
42 The mathematical equivalence depends on certain assumptions about tax rates and
rates of return. This equivalence formed the basis of the Department of the Treasury's
alternative approaches in Bluepintsfor Basic Tax Reform. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUE-
PRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 123-24 (1977), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/
tax-policy/library/blueprints/full.pdf.
43 There are other examples of the move towards a consumption tax that are not explic-
itly savings-oriented. For example, the bonus depreciation allowances in I.R.C. § 168(k)
(West Supp. 2004) inch closer towards a consumption tax expensing model, and the reduc-
tion in the rate of tax on dividend and capital gain income moves closer towards exempting
capital income from tax, as in a prepaid-type consumption tax.
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would look more meager during the budget window period-because
investments would be expensed-but would have significant long-term
equity advantages compared to a wage tax.44 To the extent that budget
manipulation is affecting substantive decisions about the design of tax
rules that have real distributional differences, it is important for the
budget rules to include present value analyses, even apart from the in-
tegrity of the numbers themselves.
The Bush administration's budget manipulations that most con-
cern Doctors Gale and Orszag arose on account of the sunsets included
in the 2001 Act and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2003 (the "2003 Act").45 Because of those sunsets, Doctors Gale and
Orszag's central inquiry in their Article is whether the Bush administra-
tion's tax cuts should be made permanent. That Congress must also ask
itself that question now-should it act to extend the tax cuts-when the
fiscal situation has deteriorated so significantly, sheds new, flattering
light on the 2001 Act's sunset. In hindsight, the sunsets may not be as
bad as the alternatives would have been. Sunsets, therefore, may be a
constructive, though cynical, tool for policymakers.
Although these sunsets were adopted because of the revenue ef-
fects they would create, sunsets affect issues beyond revenue. In par-
ticular, a sunset alters Congress's institutional responsibility for legisla-
tion, tying it in to specific future oversight of policy. Sunsets can be
seen as a tool to extend the duration of the legislative process, allow-
ing for more congressional deliberation as circumstances develop
over an extended period of time. Congress sometimes adopts laws in
too much haste, and the reconciliation process, which abbreviates law
making, contributes to this risk.46 In other areas of the law, the role of
the judiciary sometimes includes requiring greater congressional de-
liberation, but judicial review of tax legislation has never included this
4This argument assumes realistic taxpayer behavior and rules, that is, it assumes that
taxpayers do not adjust their portfolios perfectly on account of changes in tax rules and
that the realization rule and limitations on loss allowances remain in the Internal Revenue
Code (the "Code"). For an analysis of why a cash-flow consumption tax is fairer than a
wage tax, see generally Edward J. McCaffery, The Fair Timing of Tax (2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=441344 (date posted Sept. 8, 2003). See also Gale & Orszag,
supra note 1, at 1220-24 (indicating that a wage tax provides transition relief to existing
capital and is therefore more regressive than a cash-flow consumption tax).
45 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, 99 TAX NoTs 1553,
1553 (2003) (arguing that the "[r]ecent sunsets have been motivated by the desire to ma-
nipulate budget rules and hide the likely costs of new tax cuts").
46 Under reconciliation, debate is limited. See generally Michael Evans, The Budget Process
and the "Sunset" Provisions of the 2001 Tax Law, 99 TAX NoTEs 405 (2003) (describing the
reconciliation process).
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type of inquiry.47 Requiring Congress to revisit important tax changes
in light of increasing fiscal concerns, renewed caution, or other rele-
vant post-enactment developments are all reasons to favor sunsets for
major tax legislation that alters a long-followed course or drastically
alters federal revenues. 48
This institutional justification for sunsets is best suited to major
legislative changes because of their policy importance, and not all tax
law sunsets fit into this category. An alternative to the blanket sunset in
the 2001 Act was piecemeal sunsets of individual provisions, a common
practice in the tax law. Historically, Congress has extended minor expir-
ing provisions. Although these extensions may be considered harmless,
it is possible that small, piecemeal sunsets ultimately may be worse for
fiscal discipline, distributive justice, and legal complexity than global
sunsets of the type that the 2001 Act faces.49
First, as a matter of fiscal discipline, piecemeal renewal allows
Congress to chip away at revenue in very small increments, each ac-
tion seeming insignificant to the overall budget picture. Conversely,
reenactment on a global sunset requires an overall fiscal assessment
under which it is more difficult to ignore a dire fiscal situation. Sec-
ond, as a matter of distributive justice, piecemeal sunsets make the
expiration of provisions that benefit lower-income families easy for
politicians because the publicity that surrounds the sunset of a small
provision is likely to be far less than the publicity surrounding its
original adoption. For example, as Doctors Gale and Orszag point
out, the "Saver's Credit" for low-income families, and the deduction
for educational expenses of lower- and middle-income families are
not proposed for extension in the Bush administration's budget pro-
47 See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 639-41 (1999) (invalidating federal statute when Congress had insufficient evidence
to show constitutional inadequacy of state remedies); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
563 (1995) (noting that "to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected inter-
state commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they
are lacking here").
4 8 Prior to the adoption of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 (the "2001 Act"), economist Eugene Steuerle argued that the best argument for sun-
sets is based on parity for tax and expenditure programs. He wrote that "[s]unsets simply
move some programs closer to the status accorded to appropriated programs, for which
annual or periodic decisions must be made if they are to continue or grow." Eugene
Steuerle, Sunsets: The Case for and Against, 78 TAx NoTEs 1713, 1713 (1998). Viewed in this
way, sunsets do not seem particularly dramatic or insidious.
49 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150.
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posal, but there has been little public attention paid to their immi-
nent disappearance. 50 Finally, the piecemeal approach causes confu-
sion because it requires taxpayer attention to detail, burdening plan-
ning and compliance. The ever-changing benefit from the child credit
($1000 to $700 to $1000 to $500 over the next six years) that Doctors
Gale and Orszag describe is a good example of why we should avoid
piecemeal sunsets that affect the tax of relatively unsophisticated tax-
payers. 51 If a family cannot predict its child tax credit reasonably or
count on it annually, it will not be encouraged to spend it, and a re-
duction in the tax credit from one year to the next is particularly bad
for the morale of average taxpayers who are understandably disap-
pointed when they fill out their returns.
In 2001, the most likely alternative to the sunset of the 2001 Act
was a permanent tax cut for the rich, including permanent repeal of
the estate tax.52 Reinstating a repealed estate tax would have been vir-
tually impossible, and the ensuing loss to progressivity would have been
devastating. Although it is unrealistic to expect that Congress will allow
the full return of the estate tax as it existed prior to the 2001 Act, for
proponents of progressivity, revisiting is better than repeal.
III. FIXING THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX
One of the major concerns Doctors Gale and Orszag raise in their
Article is the projected growth of the AMT. They estimate that 40 mil-
lion households may be subject to the AMT in ten years.53 As the chart
in Appendix 1 shows, indexing the exemption would prevent massive
increases in the numbers of taxpayers on track to become subject to the
AMT.54 Nevertheless, Table 2 of Doctor Gale and Orszag's article sug-
gests that there is something more fundamentally troubling about the
AMT than its failure to index the exemption.55 It shows the effect of the
AMT on the Bush administration's tax cuts and illustrates that by 2014,
the AMT will take back almost forty percent of the tax cut for taxpayers
50 Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at app. tbls.lc & Id.
51 See id. at app. tbl.lb.
52 The tax cut was supported by at least half of the members of the Senate, but it did
not have the support of sixty members, which would have been necessary to prevent a
possible filibuster of the bill if it had not been considered under the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974's reconciliation process. For a full discussion of the procedural aspects of the
2001 Act, see generally Evans, supra note 46.
53 Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1165.
54 See Appendix 1 (prepared by William G. Gale).
55 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at app. tbl.2.
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with AGIs between $75,000 and $100,000 and sixty-five percent for tax-
payers with AGIs between $100,000 and $500,000. But taxpayers with
incomes exceeding $1 million will lose a mere seven percent of their
cut to the AMT. Thus, taxpayers receiving the greatest cuts from the
Bush administration's tax plan are also the ones who are able to keep
most of it despite the AMT. According to these numbers, the AMT is
destined to become a force for decreasing progressivity, compared to
the regular tax, even though the regular tax has itself become more
generous to the rich.56
Given that the AMT is on course to tax middle-class married
people with children in high-tax states more heavily than rich families
with tax preferences that understate their taxable income compared
to their economic income, repeal of the AMT is an attractive option.
57
An alternative to repeal, however, is substantive reform that would
return the AMT to its original purpose, which was to ensure that high-
income taxpayers could not use preferences to obliterate their tax li-
ability.58 We could better design the AMT so that it can fulfill its origi-
nal promise of making the rich pay their share.
The core problem with the AMT is its anachronistic understanding
of tax preferences. The reason why the richest taxpayers in Table 2 suf-
56 See Gale et al., supra note 22, at 1540 tbl.1 (showing that tax rates declined more for
high-income taxpayers than for low-income taxpayers, and that high-income taxpayers
enjoyed a greater percentage increase in after-tax income than low-income taxpayers on
account of the 2001 Act and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
(the "2003 Act")).
57 Repeal of the AMT is the preferred approach of many experts. See, e.g., Allen
Kenney, Former Commissioners Say It's Time to Scrap AMT, 103 TAX NoTEs 1466, 1466-67
(2004) (reporting on testimony of former Internal Revenue Service Commissioners Don-
ald Alexander, Sheldon Cohen, Mortimer Caplin, and Fred T. Goldberg). The National
Taxpayer Advocate has repeatedly called for repeal. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra
note 9, at 15 (reiterating the Advocate's 2001 recommendation for repeal); see also Mat-
thew Bailey, National Taxpayers Union Warns of "AMT Storm," 2004 TAX NoTs TODAY (Apr.
22, 2004), LEXIS, 2004 TNT 79-23 (identifying supporters of the repeal of the AMT); Sec-
tion of Taxation, Am. Bar Ass'n et al., Tax Simplification Recommendations from ABA, AICPA,
and TEI, 2000 TAx NOTES TODAY (Feb. 25, 2000), LEXIS, 2000 TNT 39-82 (presenting a
joint recommendation advocating repeal of the AMT).
51 The original version was adopted after a few wealthy taxpayers were reported to
have paid no tax. See Leonard Burman et al., The AMT: Out of Contro4 TAx POL'Y ISSUES &
OPTIONS (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Ctr., Wash., D.C.), Sept. 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.urban.org//UploadedPDF/310565_AMT OutofControl.pdf. It has recently
been noted that the original version of the AMT was "a minimum tax primarily on capital
gains." Wonne Hinson & Ralph Tower, Influence of Long-Term Capital Gains on Individual
AMT, 102 TAX NoTEs 403, 404 (2004). The original list of nine types of preferences in-
cluded capital gains, excess investment income, and accelerated depreciation. See Tax Re-
form Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 487, 580.
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fer so little from the AMT is because the AMT preferences bear little
resemblance to the real preferences that are now in the Code, namely
the reduced rates on capital gains and dividends.59 Middle and upper-
middle-income taxpayers are being hit with the AMT mostlv because
they pay high state and local taxes, 60 have a lot of children, 6' or incur
substantial employee business expenses. 62 A few must pay because they
have worthless stock options63 or high attorney's fees in connection
with successful employment discrimination actions."4 None of these are
preferences that allow taxpayers to enjoy greater economic income
than taxable income-they are all real costs that affect taxpaying abil-
ity.65 Even if the exemption is adjusted for inflation, it will still take back
significant tax benefits from many upper-middle-class families, while
exempting much of the income enjoyed by the truly wealthy. The rich-
est taxpayers do not need to worry too much about the AMT's effect on
their preferred income because their low-rate capital gains and divi-
dends are not subject to it.66 If we are serious about imposing a mini-
mum effective rate of tax on a broad base of income (which is what the
AMT was intended to do), then it should extend to the income re-
ceived in the form of dividends and capital gains, which the rich receive
in large amounts. 67 The biggest tax cuts for the rich from the 2001 and
59 The AMT is designed to prevent some anachronistic sheltering behavior. See I.R.C.
§ 58 (2000) (disallowing tax shelter farm losses). But it does not affect the preferential
rates in I.R.C. § 1 (h) (West Supp. 2004).
- See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii) (disallowing deduction for taxes).
61 See id. § 56(b) (1) (E) (disallowing personal exemptions).
62 See id. § 56(b) (1) (A) (i) (disallowing miscellaneous itemized deductions).
0 See id. § 56(b) (3); Tax Simplification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. (2004), (statement of Nina Doherty, Sales
Engineer, Rivermine Software, Fairfax, Virginia, describing how the AMT on worthless
incentive stock options caused her family financial ruin), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
hearings.asp?formmode--view&id=1631 (June 15, 2004).
64 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine how to treat this issue.
Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373, 373 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1712 (2004);
Banaitis v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1713
(2004).
6 Doctor Gale has written elsewhere that more than ninety percent of taxpayers cur-
rently subject to the AMT find themselves there because of dependent exemptions, stan-
dard deductions, or itemized deductions for taxes, medical expenses, or miscellaneous
expenses. Leonard Burman, William Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, The AMT: Projections and Prob-
lems, 100 TAx NoTEs 105, 106 (2003).
6 See id. at 106, 115. Capital gains were the main target of the original AMT, but they
have not been subject to the AMT since 1986, when the capital gains preference was re-
pealed. When the preferential rate was reintroduced, the AMT preference was not. See id.
67 In 2000, the 400 taxpayers with the highest incomes averaged $124.9 million in net
capital gains apiece. Joel Slemrod, The Fortunate 400, 100 TAX NoTEs 935, 936 (2003). In
2001, taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes ("AGI") in excess of $1 million averaged about
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2003 Acts---the cut in dividend and capital gain rates and the repeal of
the estate tax-are largely immune to the AMT.68 Although indexing is
not a bad idea, the fundamental flaws in the AMT's design should not
be forgotten when focusing on indexing.
IV. MANIPULATION IN THE TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET 6 9
Doctors Gale and Orszag show various ways that the Bush admini-
stration has brought about an overt shift in tax policy.70 In addition,
the Bush administration is making a less overt, but troubling, attack
on the TEB, undermining the value of that document. The TEB is just
as important a source of information about government spending
policies as is the regular budget. As direct government spending in-
creasingly focuses on defense and security, other social and economic
programs seem to find a more amenable home in the Code, 71 which
provides an indirect, albeit just as real, source of public funds. Accord-
ing to the Joint Committee on Taxation (the "Joint Committee"), the
projected spending through the Code for 2004 through 2008 will be
$4715 billion.72 As this amount increases, the TEB's importance as a
source of data on government functions also increases.
$1.7 million in net capital gain. Calculations based on table entitled "2001 Individual In-
come Tax, All Returns: Sources of Income, Adjustments, and Tax Items, by Size of Ad-
justed Gross Income." INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME, INDIVIDUAL COM-
PLETE REPORT 2001, at tbl.1.4 (Mar. 2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/Olin14ar.xls
(last modified Mar. 23, 2004).
68 The preference for capital gains and dividends is not a preference item for AMT
purposes. Wonne Hinson and Ralph Tower found that the AMT could lead to tax on capi-
tal gains in excess of the maximum fifteen percent statutory rate, but in a highly regressive
way. Hinson & Tower, supra note 58, at 405. As the amount of a taxpayer's long-term capital
gain increases, they found that the marginal rate on long-term capital gain decreases so
that taxpayers with $1 million of long-term capital gain had an effective rate of tax close to
the fifteen percent statutory rate, whereas taxpayers with only $30,000 of long-term capital
gain had an effective rate of over twenty-one percent on their long-term capital gain on
account of the AMT. Id.
69 Although the ideas in this section were first presented on April 16, 2004 at "The
State of the Federal Income Taxation Symposium: Rates, Progressivity, and Budget Proc-
esses" at Boston College Law School, this Part of the Commentary was published previ-
ously as Linda Sugin, Wat Is Happening to the Tax Expenditure Budget, 104 TAX NOTES 763
(2004).
70 Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1158.
71 For example, healthcare funding was increased during the last year with the adop-
tion of I.R.C. § 223 (West Supp. 2004), authorizing tax-favored "Health Savings Accounts"
as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066, 2469-79.
72 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2004-2008, at 20-29 tbl.1 (JCS-8-03) (Comm. Print 2003), available at
1274 [Vol. 45:1259
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The TEB is not as transparent as the regular budget because it cre-
ates new entitlements with unknown effects, and it also attempts to
quantify an admittedly elusive number-revenue loss.73 Yet despite its
shortcomings, the TEB generally has been a useful tool because it iden-
tifies programs that might be administered through direct spending
programs, rather than through the Code.74 It also provides data that
can help to determine how the policies within the Code change over
time. Unfortunately, under the Bush administration, the integrity of the
information presented in the TEB has been diminished substantially.
Because of this, the impression of distributional effects arising from
spending policies operated through the Code has been skewed. Al-
though there has been some attention to the Bush administration's
manipulations in the presentation of the regular budget, little attention
has been focused on the manipulations in the TEB. 75 This is troubling
because the TEB is just as important a source of information about
government spending policies as the regular budget. The Bush admini-
stration, however, seems to be undermining the information in the
TEB by making small, but crucial, adjustments in the analysis underly-
ing the official numbers by adding an array of useless information that
sheds doubt on the data included in the budget itself.
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-8-03.pdf. This number may be compared to annual total net
outlays slightly in excess of $2000 billion, according to the Bush administration. See OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 39, at 338 tbl.20-1.
7s The creation of entitlements with unknown costs is not unique to the TEB, but all
items on that budget are essentially entitlements. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL McDAN-
IEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 102 (1985). The Joint Committee on Taxation's (the "Joint Com-
mittee") tax expenditure budget estimates "revenue losses" or "reductions in income tax
liabilities" on account of provisions in the Code. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
supra note 72, at 2. Both the Department of the Treasury and the Joint Committee compile
tax expenditure budgets. The Bush administration's version is included in the Office of
Management and Budget's compilation of the entire federal budget. The Bush administra-
tion estimates both projected revenue losses and outlay equivalents. See OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, supra note 39, at 294 tbl.18-3, 296 tbl.18-5.
74 I have written on this issue previously in Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and
Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 415-18 (1999).
75 See, e.g., Gale & Orszag, supra note 1, at 1168-72, 1183-86 (suggesting that the sunsets
in the 2001 and 2003 Acts were intended to hide the cost of the legislation, and that the
presentation of Social Security and Medicare shortfalls over a long horizon, compared to the
Bush administration's presentation of the cost of tax cuts over a short horizon, misleads peo-
ple into believing that the tax cuts are less costly than they really are); see also RICHARD Ko-
GAN & DAVID KAMIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, PRESIDENT'S BUDGET CON-
TAINS LARGE CUTS IN DOMESTIC DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMS (June 7, 2004) (claiming that
"budget tables that would normally show [particular budget] cuts are missing from the
budget books that the Office of Management and Budget issued"), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/2-5-04bud.pdf.
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Over the last few years, the Bush administration has adjusted the
methodologies it has used to determine the normal tax base, which
has long been used for determining tax expenditures. 76 In 2003, in its
official presentation of the TEB, 77 it changed the methodology for
determining the tax expenditure from accelerated depreciation, and
concluded that the tax expenditure is much smaller than the amount
arrived at using the prior method.78 In 2004, it continued to chip away
at the base with its treatment of the 2003 Act tax cuts for dividends
and capital gains. 79 There is nothing sacred about the normal tax
base.80 Nevertheless, its consistent use has allowed policymakers to
recognize the direction and magnitude of changes in government
subsidies over time. Changes to the baseline mislead those who rely
on the numbers presented in the budget.
Consider two examples that illustrate how the Bush administra-
tion's approach undermines the informational value of the TEB: its
analysis of comprehensive tax bases and its adoption of a presumption
against a separate corporate tax. The Bush administration includes its
analysis of comprehensive tax bases in an "Appendix,"81 suggesting
that the administration is aware that its analysis is unconventional.
The transformation of the corporate tax, however, is taking place
within the official TEB itself and is reflected in the numbers included
therein. These examples show how the Bush administration's adjust-
ments make the Code appear less generous to homeowners and hold-
ers of capital than would the traditional approach.
The most recent Bush administration estimates of tax expendi-
tures include appendices that evaluate current tax expenditures un-
76 The Joint Committee, which has been more consistent in its adherence to a single
standard, describes the "normal income tax structure" as "a broad concept of income."
STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 72, at 2.
77 See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2003), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/spec.pdf. Although there have been some dif-
ferences between the versions compiled by the Joint Committee and the Bush administra-
tion, particularly since the Ronald W. Reagan administration adopted an alternative refer-
ence baseline, they largely identify the same provisions as tax expenditures. For a
comparison of the versions, see STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 72, at 13-
16. I am suggesting that this general historical parity between the budgets may now be
eroding on account of the Bush administration's recent changes.78 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 39, at 322-23.
79Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 301-
302, 117 Stat. 752, 758-64 (2003) (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (h) ( West Supp. 2004)).
80 I have argued against its constitutionalization on those grounds. See Sugin, supra
note 74, at 418-30.
81 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 39, at 314-25.
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der an ideal income tax and an ideal consumption tax.8 2 But without
providing any constructive information, the method used in that
presentation undermines the normal tax base of the traditional
budget because the Bush administration starts with the items listed in
the traditional TEB and asks whether each item would be a tax ex-
penditure in a comprehensive income tax (or consumption tax). It
concludes that only fourteen of the thirty largest items in the TEB
would be tax expenditures in a comprehensive income tax.83
In comparing the current list to an ideal, the Bush administra-
tion's analysis chooses a reference point that bears no relation to ei-
ther our actual tax or the ideal itself. Of what use is the conclusion
that the step-up in basis at death under section 1014 would not be a
tax expenditure if we had a mark-to-market system because in such a
system the step-up amount would always be zero?84 Similarly, what
good is it to know that state and local taxes would be properly de-
ductible if government benefits were included in income?85 The table
included in the Appendix, with its list of questionable items from the
TEB86 is insidious (rather than simply useless) because it has the ef-
fect of questioning the normative significance of many of the largest
items in the TEB.8
7
The deduction for home mortgage interest, the second largest
item in the Bush administration's official TEB, is part of a special analy-
sis of owner-occupied housing in the Appendix: in a comprehensive
income tax, the imputed income from home ownership would be tax-
able, and therefore, the costs of producing that income, like home
mortgage interest, property taxes, and depreciation, would be properly
deductible. 88 Consistent with such an analysis and the taxation of im-
puted income, the deduction for home mortgage interest would not be
8 See id. (regarding fiscal year 2005); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 77, at
130-40 (regarding fiscal year 2004).
8 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 39, at 324 app. tbl.1.
84 This is the essence of the argument made in AnalyticalPerspectives, Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 2005. See id. at 316.8 5 Id. at 317.
86 The table is divided into sections with subtitles that include "Possibly a Tax Expendi-
ture Under a Comprehensive Income Tax, But with Some Qualifications" and "Probably
Not a Tax Expenditure Under a Comprehensive Income Tax." See id. at 324 app. tbl.1.
87 For example, it treats as "uncertain" the exclusion of employer contributions for
medical insurance premiums and medical care, the largest single item on the official TEB.
See id. at 294 tbl.18-3, 324 app. tbl.1.
88 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 39, at 294 tbl.18-3. This is standard text-
book analysis. See LAURIE MALMAN ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL TAX BASE 348 (2002).
12772004]
HeinOnline  -- 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1277 2003-2004
Boston College Law Review
a tax expenditure. 89 The Bush administration's Appendix Table 3, "Re-
vised Tax Expenditure Estimates," applying this approach, quantifies
the tax expenditure as the failure to include the imputed income,
rather than as the allowance of the supporting deductions.90 The result
is that the tax expenditure for homeowners in the official TEB is almost
four times larger than it would be in the Bush administration's alterna-
tive: imputed rent for 2005 is about $24 billion, according to Appendix
Table 3, compared to the TEB's $89 billion for the deductions of home
mortgage interest and home property taxes.91 The Bush administra-
tion's revised estimates imply that homeowners do not receive nearly as
large a government subsidy under the Code as the TEB suggests. 92
In addition to its failure to defend adequately its determination
of $24 billion for the 2005 imputed rent on owner-occupied housing,
the Bush administration's approach actually does not revise the tax
expenditure analysis fully in keeping with a comprehensive income
tax base.93 It only attempts to account for the imputed income from
living in one's home-a consumption item. But it completely ignores
the untaxed appreciation in that home.94 A comprehensive income
89 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 39, at 323.
90 See id. at 325 app. tbl.3.
91 The Bush administration notes that the estimate is only one-third as large as the tax
expenditure for the home mortgage deduction because it does not aggregate the tax ex-
penditure for the property tax deduction. See id. at 323.
92 The table quantifies the tax expenditure for imputed rent on owner-occupied hous-
ing as about $24 billion for 2005. This is compared to the estimate of the tax expenditure
for the deductibility of home mortgage interest of almost $70 billion, plus $19 billion for
the deductibility of taxes on owner-occupied homes. Id. at 294 tb1.18-3. Under the Bush
administration's analysis, actually imputing the $24 billion income (that is, taxing it or
including it in the TEB) to homeowners makes the $89 billion in home-related deductions
disappear from the TEB.
93 The Bush administration states that "[t] his estimate starts with the [National Income
and Product Accounts (the "NIPA")] calculated value of gross rent on owner-occupied hous-
ing, and subtracts interest, taxes, economic depreciation, and other costs in arriving at an
estimate of net-rental income from owner-occupied housing." Id. at 323 (citing National In-
come and Product Accounts, Table 2.4). The Commerce Department's NIPA Table 2.4.5.,
"Personal Consumption Expenditures by Type of Product," contains a 2002 entry of $820.7
billion for "owner occupied nonfarm dwellings-space rent," which indicates that the Bush
administration's adjustments to the NIPA data were quite substantial. BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS TABLES § 2
tbl.2.4.5 (2004), http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=69&
FirstYear=2002&LastYear= 2003&Freq=Year (last revised Aug. 5, 2004).
94 The Code permanently excludes from tax most gains from appreciation in owner-
occupied housing, favoring homes compared to other investment assets. See I.R.C. § 121
(West Supp. 2004). But even deferral of gain until sale is a significant tax benefit.
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tax would have to include both consumption and accumulation. 95
Thus, the Appendix's analysis, even on its own terms, is incomplete in
a way that understates tax benefits enjoyed by homeowners. 96
The Bush administration's use of the comprehensive benchmark
provides no useful information for policymakers looking at the Code.
If we are interested in knowing how much our tax system departs
from an ideal income tax, it is nonsense to start from an evaluation of
the current list of tax expenditures. Rather, to be internally consis-
tent, we must start all over again and identify the comprehensive in-
come tax baseline. Once comprehensive income, without regard to
sources, uses, or administration, is determined, then a TEB could be
devised by comparing our system to that ideal. But a comprehensive
income base would differ significantly from the normal tax base that
traditionally has been the underpinning for the TEB. For example, it
would include gains and losses as they accrue over time, and an array
of non-cash consumption benefits. 97
The Bush administration's Appendix is misleading compared to
an analysis that uses comprehensive income as the baseline because
only a subset of appropriate departures from that base is considered.
By starting with the current TEB, the Bush administration's tables
only allow for the recharacterization of tax expenditures as normal,
but do not allow for the recharacterization of anything that currently
is treated as normal as a tax expenditure. To the extent that normal
items under the traditional standards are more generous to high-
income taxpayers, the Bush administration's analysis exacerbates that
bias and makes the resulting set of tax expenditures appear less favor-
able to those taxpayers than would a more comprehensive approach.
For example, if the Bush administration defined an ideal income tax
as the general baseline, then the TEB would include the benefits from
95 A consumption tax, by design, fails to tax accumulation. The difficulty of taxing the
accumulation aspect of income has led some people to prefer a consumption tax to an
income tax. See, e.g., William Andrews, A Consumption Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1974) (arguing that the "worst inequity, distortion and com-
plexity [in the income tax] arise out of inconsistency in the treatment of accumulation").
96 Taxpayers benefiting most from the home mortgage deduction are those earning
$200,000 and over (the highest income class in the distributional tables). Taxpayers earn-
ing between $50,000 and $75,000 receive an average benefit of $1087, whereas those earn-
ing $200,000 and over receive an average benefit of $6305. Calculations based on STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 72, at 35 tbl.3.
97 A comprehensive income tax base is not self-defining, and there is a rich literature
debating it. See generally COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION (Joseph A. Pechman ed.,
1977); Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 925 (1967).
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the realization rule as a tax expenditure, which would more than off-
set the removal of the step-up in basis under section 1014 of the Code
from the analysis. Similarly, inclusion of appreciation in home values,
along with a sober assessment of imputed income from home owner-
ship, would produce a more complete picture of the distribution of
tax benefits among income groups.
If we evaluate significance within the budget process by looking
at the numbers, the treatment of the corporate tax in the latest Bush
administration TEB dwarfs any other issues concerning tax expendi-
tures. The Appendix describes the corporate tax as a negative tax ex-
penditure, and Appendix Table 3 quantifies the negative tax expendi-
ture from the double tax on corporate profits at $24 billion to $34
billion each year from 2003 through 2009.98
In addition to the treatment in the Appendix, the Bush admini-
stration's latest official version of the TEB itself, for the first time,
treats integration of the corporate and individual taxes as normal, de-
suite its statement that a separate corporate tax is part of the baseline.
99 This change in the definition of the normal base is demonstrated by
its treatment of the capital gain and dividend rate cut contained in
the 2003 Act, which it explains as follows:
Although not in line with previous reference tax law or nor-
mal tax law baselines, our tables exclude from the list of tax
expenditures JGTRRA's reductions in the tax rate on divi-
dends. Reference law used for the FY 2005 Budget includes
capital gains as tax expenditure, but only to the extent capi-
tal gains have not previously been taxed under the corporate
income tax. Similarly, the lower tax rate on dividends is not
included as a tax expenditure under reference law because
dividends have generally already been taxed under the cor-
porate income tax.100
The Bush administration justifies this treatment as a move toward
a more comprehensive income tax base (despite the fact that the nor-
mal baseline for generating the TEB has never been a comprehensive
income tax base). But the problem here is similar to the one discussed
above concerning the Appendix: it is misleading to move selectively
98 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 39, at 325 app. tbl.3. This constitutes about
sixteen percent of the total corporate tax receipts estimated earlier in the document. See
id. at 239, 325.
99 Id. at 299.
100 Id. at 300.JGTRRA is the 2003 Act.
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toward a comprehensive baseline. The Bush administration's TEB fails
to give a complete picture relative to an integrated standard of com-
prehensive income, which might include a fair amount of dividends
not taxed previously. If the TEB were to adopt accurately an integrated
standard, the tax on corporate income would need to pass through,
without corporate preferences, to individuals.
The Bush administration equates the corporate income tax with a
double tax on corporate profits.' 10 This is not accurate if corporate
income is not taxed fully at either level.102 The Bush administration
fails to determine the extent to which income actually is taxed to the
corporation, satisfying itself that dividends "generally" have been
taxed at the corporate level.' 0 3 Whether and how much tax has been
paid by the corporation is an empirical question, the answer to which
determines whether the Bush administration's treatment is defensi-
ble. There is reason to believe that corporate income is not taxed as
heavily as the Bush administration assumes; according to a recent
Government Accountability Office study, most corporations are pay-
ing no tax, and ninety-four percent are paying tax at rates less than
five percent of income. 10 4
The Bush administration's new position in the TEB is contrary to
the treatment of the classical system throughout the history of the
TEB, and makes the recent tax cut directed at holders of corporate
stock disappear entirely from the comparison of tax benefits before
and after the 2003 Act. Its approach to the 2003 Act normalizes the
loss of significant tax previously paid by individuals, without any real
inquiry into how much tax is actually paid by the corporations making
distributions that are now taxed at such drastically lower rates.105 In its
explanation, the Bush administration states that this treatment was
determined "as part of Treasury's ongoing reevaluation of the tax ex-
penditure concept" and that it "gradually" is changing the baseline
101 Id. at 318.
102 In his new book, economist Eugene Steuerle writes that "some individuals achieve
very large capital gains on their successful investments far in excess of any retained earn-
ings on which corporate tax may have been paid." STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 25.
103 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 39, at 300.
104 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPARISON OF THE RE-
PORTED TAX LIABILITIES OF FOREIGN- AND U.S.-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, 1996-2000, at
2 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04358.pdf. The General Account-
ing Office recently has become the Government Accountability Office.
105 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 39, at 324 (quantifying the negative tax
expenditure from multiple levels of tax under the classical system, while failing to substan-
tiate or defend its treatment of earnings as "fully taxed at the corporate level").
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used in the TEB. 10 6 But it is precisely this gradual change that is prob-
lematic because it is most likely to mislead. By redefining the baseline
at a moment of a significant change in the law and distribution of the
tax burden, the Bush administration's analysis succeeds in preventing
the latest tax benefits for the rich from showing up in the TEB at
all. 10 7 The Joint Committee's analysis quantifies the lost revenue from
the reduced rate on dividends and capital gains as $406 billion for
2004 through 2008,108 whereas the Bush administration's 2005
through 2009 number is only $178 billion. ° 9 Policymakers comparing
last year's Bush administration budget with this year's Bush admini-
stration budget might not realize that the 2003 Act provided a tre-
mendous windfall to individuals who enjoy that reduced rate.110 An
innocent reader reasonably would conclude that recipients of capital
gains now could expect to pay more in tax.
If the TEB is to do anything, it should indicate which policies the
government supports through the tax system. The incremental attack
being waged on the TEB baseline makes it increasingly difficult for that
document to provide any useful information. Although that effect may
have been deliberate, it is nevertheless a real loss for policymakers.
CONCLUSION
As federal economic policy develops, policymakers must grapple
with the dire budgetary issues raised by Doctors Gale and Orszag. At
the same time, policymakers must approach budget processes with
great sensitivity to distributional concerns. This Commentary attempts
to foster greater attention on some of the challenges to progressivity
within current budget policy. A commitment to distributional fairness
must be reflected in both the information side of the budget process,
and in the determination of substantive changes in law. The TEB,
106 Id, at 300.
107 William Gale, Peter Orszag, and Isaac Shapiro have quantified the distribution of
the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, and concluded that the top 0.1% of the income distribution
receives the largest percentage increase in after-tax income on account of the cuts. See Gale
et al.. supra note 22, at 1539.
108 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 72, at 23.
109 That number only includes capital gains because the Department of the Treasury
treats the dividends as not producing any tax expenditure. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
supra note 39, at 294 tbl.18-3, 300.
110 Last year's budget of the Office of Management and Budget had almost $260 bil-
lion as the five-year estimate, compared to $178 billion in 2004. Compare OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, supra note 39, at 294 (regarding budget for fiscal year 2005), with OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 77, at 110 (regarding budget for fiscal year 2004).
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revenue estimates, and distributional tables all need to present a more
complete and reliable description than they currently provide, so as to
enable policymakers to adopt laws that produce a fair distribution of
the tax burden. A combination of procedural and substantive reforms
would go a long way toward improving the results of the budget proc-
ess, from the perspectives of both fiscal responsibility and distribu-
tional fairness.
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